Emory Law Journal
Volume 59
Issue 5 Colloquium — Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of Feminism and Legal Theory Project
2010

Beauty in the Dark of Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal
Law
Martha Grace Duncan
Emory University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Martha G. Duncan, Beauty in the Dark of Night: The Pleasures of Form in Criminal Law, 59 Emory L. J.
1203 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol59/iss5/7

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL

9/10/2010 10:25 AM

BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT†: THE PLEASURES OF
FORM IN CRIMINAL LAW
Martha Grace Duncan*
Our need for beauty springs from the gloom and pain which we
experience from our destructive impulses . . . ; our wish is to find in
art evidence of the triumph of life over death.
—John Rickman, Selected Contributions to Psycho-Analysis1

PROLOGUE
In a noisy Italian restaurant, over low bowls of steaming eggplant
parmigiana, an old friend startled me one evening by saying, “I just don’t know
how you can work in that field.” By “that field,” I realized my friend meant
criminal law, though I still don’t understand why she condemned it so harshly.
It’s the goriness, I suppose, all the grisly facts—neighbors attacking each other
with a hatchet and carving knife in a dispute over a doorstop; a man stabbing
his wife nineteen times after she taunted him for his passivity; and castaways
slaying a boy to consume his flesh when adrift on the high seas. I expect that
is what she meant by her surprising remark.
She would not have thought my work unethical, as some people believe it
is to represent those accused of crimes, for I neither defend nor prosecute
† Beauty, an elusive and perhaps ineffable concept, has been the subject of numerous attempts at
definition. For purposes of this essay, I am adopting the following definition: “That perfection in the sensuous
order, and, by extension, in the spiritual order, which excites admiration or delight for itself rather than for its
uses . . . .” WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 241 (2d ed. 1947).
The phrase dark of night is a common literary reference to criminality. See MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN,
ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 123–29
(1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 255–266.
* Ph.D., Columbia University, 1976; J.D., Yale University, 1983; Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. Earlier versions of this Essay were presented to the Emory Law Faculty Colloquium and the
Feminist Legal Theory Workshop. I am grateful to the participants for their suggestions. For helpful
comments on previous drafts of this Essay, I also thank Courtney Allan, Thomas Arthur, Robert Atwan,
Angelika Bammer, Harold Braswell, Morgan Cloud, Dorothy Cornwell, Natalia Duque, Richard Duncan,
Leslie Fields, Martha Fineman, Marjorie Girth, Nathan Hartman, Allan Hunter, Patricia Horwitz, Kay Levine,
Betty Moore, Colleen Murphy, Noor Najafi, Ani Satz, Robert Schapiro, Julie Seaman, Charles Shanor, George
Shepherd, Sara Stadler, Molly Tinsley, Kathy Van Spanckeren, Liza Vertinsky, and Amanda Wilson.
1 JOHN RICKMAN, On the Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse, in SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 68, 88 (1957).
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defendants. I am a law professor, and my contact with flesh-and-blood
criminals extends only so far as visiting prisons and interviewing convicts for
research purposes. Some of the prisoners I’ve interviewed have become my
friends; others, my long-term correspondents, through the process of my
learning and writing about them. Mostly, though, I work not with criminals
but with criminal law—a field I adore. You could say, following Max Weber,
that I live for as well as off my chosen field.2
I. “FRAUGHT WITH BACKGROUND”3: CRIMINAL LAW AS A “LANGUAGE
EVENT”4
My favorite crime is depraved heart murder. It boasts the most poetic name
and the most poetic definition as well. At common law, this form of homicide
is defined as murder committed with an “abandoned and malignant heart”5—as
lovely and evocative a phrase as you will find anywhere. To be sure, this
formula sometimes deteriorates into a dead metaphor, losing its rich
connotations and retaining only a precise meaning stipulated by code. But now
and then a judge or jury resuscitates the image, reviving its original, eloquent
poetry.
This happened in the 1928 case of Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, where
the twenty-year-old defendant struck a male pedestrian and the pedestrian’s
2

See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 84 (H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948) (distinguishing between living “for” politics and living “off” politics).
3 See ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE 18
(Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (1946).
4 See NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE 60 (1982). With its focus on
criminal law as a “language event,” this Essay falls into the “law as literature” sub-genre of the law-andliterature movement. Unlike “law in literature,” which explores legal themes in fiction, “law as literature”
examines legal documents—testimony, jury instructions, judicial opinions, and the like—to analyze their
literary qualities. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 269–
316 (1988); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW & LITERATURE 5–34 (1992);
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES B.
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); Guyora Binder, Aesthetic Judgment and Legal Justification, 43
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 79 (2008). I am indebted to these and other law-and-literature scholars for their
inspiration and insights. My own approach differs from theirs in its exclusive focus on criminal law and in its
use of literary criticism to contribute to the debate over the respective merits of the Model Penal Code and the
common law. See infra text accompanying notes 211–239.
5 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 428 (8th ed. 2007); 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2009)); see
also JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 384 (5th ed. 2004) (referring to “an abandoned and malignant heart”
as “one of the commonest verbal formulations of the state of mind necessary to establish non-intentional
murder”). Another beautiful common law definition of depraved heart murder is “a heart void of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief.” Id. (quoting Mays v. People, 806 Ill. 306 (1883)).
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wife and baby while driving recklessly.6 As a result of the accident, the
husband and baby died, and a jury convicted the defendant of murder.7 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, noting that
the defendant’s compassionate behavior after the collision—specifically, his
assistance in transporting one of the victims to the hospital—“negative[s] the
idea of wickedness of disposition or hardness of heart” required for depraved
heart murder.8
This opinion is astonishing because, typically, only behavior leading up to
and including the crime “counts” to establish the crime’s elements. But here
the court considered acts occurring after the crime was over—after the mens
rea (guilty mind) and the actus reus (guilty act) had been established. In so
doing, it seems the judges were influenced by the metaphorical language of
depraved heart, which caused them to assess the defendant’s character instead
of merely his criminal act. Upon finding that the defendant lacked the elusive
quality the metaphor suggests, albeit based on his behavior after the crime, the
court reversed the conviction of murder.9
Another poetically-named doctrine is heat of passion, a formula that
reduces murder to manslaughter when a “killing, though intentional, [is]
committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood.”10 Just as with
depraved heart, so too with heat of passion: the words cannot be dismissed as
mere embellishment—a decorative phrase added to the core meaning for
literary effect. Rather, the name heat of passion is central to the meaning
itself—essence, not accident; a leitmotif rather than a chance image. The name
has driven the doctrine, spinning off two other legal metaphors: cooling off and
rekindling. The cooling off doctrine states that even when the defendant’s

6

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 142 A. 213, 214–15 (Pa. 1928).
Id.
8 Id. at 215.
9 Id. at 216. On rare occasions, other judges have likewise resurrected the metaphorical meaning of
depraved heart. This is particularly striking in a New York case because New York’s penal code closely
follows the Model Penal Code. See People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 618 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (citing defendant’s anguish and despair after the crime as a sign that there was no “evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt of that hardness of heart . . . qualifying as depraved indifference” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For an example of a court reverting to the metaphorical meaning of “malice
aforethought,” see State v. Myers, 510 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Neb. 1994) (holding that both intent and “malice” are
required for second degree murder). However, this holding was reversed four years later when the court held
that the word “malice” is basically superfluous. See State v. Burlison, 583 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Neb. 1998).
10 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862).
7
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blood has been “kindled by fire,”11 he may not avail himself of the heat of
passion defense if his blood had time to “cool[]” before he inflicted the fatal
blow.12 Nonetheless, the cooling-time limitation can sometimes be overcome
by the theory that a fresh incident occurring right before the homicide
“rekindled” the prior provocation.13
A number of jurisdictions have modernized their codes, rejecting the
ancient phrase heat of passion in favor of the doctrine of Extreme Emotional
Disturbance (EED). But several of these states reverted to the old formula
after a brief experience with the new,14 and a few high courts in states that
adopted and kept the modern wording found it impossible to abandon the
traditional metaphor completely.15 In explaining how the new standard
allowed for more time to elapse before “cooling off” would negate the
defendant’s “hot blood,” one court said, “[I]t may be that a significant mental
trauma has affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial period of time,
simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the
fore.”16
Like depraved heart and heat of passion, malice aforethought is an ancient
doctrine of criminal law that evades precise definition. I treasure the doctrine’s
mellifluous rhythms, its mysteriousness, and its resonance with times long
past. As powerful as it is beautiful, the metaphor of malice aforethought
determines the difference between intent-to-kill murder and heat-of-passion
voluntary manslaughter, and between depraved heart murder and criminal
negligence. It has been called “‘the grand criterion’” of murder.17 Yet, if you
11 Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I—Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model
Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 275 (1986) (quoting the great jurist Sir Edward Coke at 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES 51, 55 (1628)).
12 LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 15.2(d)–(e).
13 KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 399–400.
14 See Singer, supra note 11, at 293–94 (discussing the mixed experience with the Code’s formulation in
Ohio, Washington, Maine, and Wisconsin).
15 See, e.g., State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999) (using the words “simmered” and
“simmering” to describe extreme emotional disturbance); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1288 (Del. 1978)
(citing with approval the language “simmering in the unknowing subconscious” to interpret extreme emotional
disturbance); McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 2006) (employing the term “inflamed”
to clarify extreme emotional disturbance); People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976) (employing
the phrase “simmering in the unknowing subconscious” to describe an act that caused extreme emotional
disturbance); People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (using the words “smouldering”
and “ignited” to explain that the jury could have found evidence of extreme emotional disturbance).
16 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 908 (emphasis added).
17 Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *198–99).
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were to ask what malice aforethought means, you would learn that it has little
to do with the words that comprise it.18
Sometimes I warn my students, “The term malice aforethought is a false
friend, a misleading cognate, like the Spanish word embarasada.” I pause.
“What does embarasada appear to mean?”
A few students call out, “Embarrassed.”
“What does it mean?”
Someone yells “Pregnant!,” and the class laughs.
Other times, I remind my students of Voltaire’s witticism about the Holy
Roman Empire being “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.”19 Similarly, I
explain, malice aforethought requires neither malice nor forethought. Rather,
malice aforethought can be satisfied by an unintentional killing with a
“depraved heart” or by felony murder when an accidental death occurs in
furtherance of another felony.
The divergence between the lay and legal meanings of malice aforethought
has existed for a long time. As early as 1887, in what has since become a
classic statement, a distinguished English jurist named James Fitzjames
Stephen alerted jurors to the risk of misunderstanding:
The definition of murder is unlawful homicide with malice
aforethought; and the words malice aforethought are technical.
You must not, therefore, construe them or suppose that they can
be construed by ordinary rules of language. The words have to be
construed according to a long series of decided cases, which have
given them meanings different from those which might be
supposed.20
That last sentence, with its refreshing candor, always makes me laugh.
Judge Stephen’s jury instruction highlights a point that students of the law
often miss, namely, that malice aforethought (like criminal law generally) is a

18 See Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and
Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 313 (1999) (characterizing “the meaning of ‘malice aforethought’
[as] one of law’s great mysteries”); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE
L.J. 537, 537 (1934) (stating that neither “malice” nor “aforethought” has the meaning indicated by “the face
value of these words”).
19 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 417 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968) (quoting
Voltaire).
20 R. v. Serné (1887) 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 312 (Central Crim. Ct).
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“language event[].”21 In other words, malice aforethought alludes to the
language of past cases as much as to events in the “real” or external world.
This implicit referencing of other parts of the canon is what literary critic
Northrop Frye has called the “centripetal”—as distinct from the
“centrifugal”—meaning of a verbal structure.22 In the Bible, for example,
some New Testament stories are meant to be read not merely as parables, nor
as descriptions of actual events, but also as the fulfillment of Old Testament
prophecies.23 To read a text oblivious to its centripetal meaning, warns Frye, is
to read incompetently.24 By the same token, to read the phrase malice
aforethought oblivious of its embedment in a legal canon is to miss an essential
part of its meaning.
Not long ago, I chanced upon a phrase that exquisitely describes malice
aforethought. It appears in Erich Auerbach’s classic work, Mimesis: The
Representation of Reality in Western Literature.25 In his opening chapter,
Auerbach explains that the Homeric poems, despite their linguistic and
intellectual sophistication, are actually much less sophisticated than the Old
Testament stories in terms of the characters’ psychological development.26
“Odysseus on his return,” he writes, “is exactly the same as he was when he
left Ithaca two decades earlier.”27 In contrast, “what a road, what a fate, lie
between the Jacob who cheated his father out of his blessing and the old man
whose favorite son has been torn to pieces by a wild beast!”28 The Old
Testament patriarchs evolved over time, and when we see them in old age, at
their most complex, they are, in Auerbach’s wonderful phrase, “fraught with
background.”29 Like these patriarchs, the term malice aforethought has
changed through time—not decades, but centuries—and when we study the
doctrine now, we find that it is laden with accreted meaning and emotion—that
it too is “fraught with background.”

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See FRYE, supra note 4, at 60 (emphasis added).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 58.
See AUERBACH, supra note 3.
See id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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II. THE MYSTERY OF CHARACTER IN CRIMINAL LAW
You meet some intriguing characters in Criminal Law. Consider, for
instance, the mathematician named Edmund Beauclerc Staples who, one
autumn in 1967, when his wife was away, decided to become a bank robber.
In pursuit of his plan, he leased an office above a bank in Hollywood, moved
some tools onto the premises, and drilled holes in the floor directly above the
vault. Feeling tired and afraid after this exertion, he covered the holes with a
rug and drifted off to sleep. In the ensuing weeks, apart from returning to the
office a few times, he took no further steps toward robbing the bank. In fact,
he allowed his lease to lapse at the end of the first month, whereupon his
landlord discovered the holes in the floor and called the police. Staples was
later charged with attempted burglary.30
In a remarkable confession, Mr. Staples described the epiphany that led
him to abandon his criminal scheme: “The actutal [sic] commencement of my
plan made me begin to realize that even if I were to succeed a fugitive life of
living off of stolen money would not give me the enjoyment of the life of a
mathematician however humble a job I might have.”31 Nevertheless, Staples’s
belief in his insight wavered. Even after his realization that the life of a
criminal was not for him, he went back to the room he had leased and
contemplated going forward with the robbery. He confessed to feeling that he
had made a “certain investment of time, money, effort and a certain
pschological [sic] commitment to the concept.”32 Ultimately, his better
judgment prevailed. As he explained, “My wife came back and my life as a
bank robber seemed more and more absurd.” 33
I love the anti-heroic character of Edmund Staples,34 who—seemingly tired
of a humdrum existence and temporarily without the structure his marriage
provides—conceives the romantic notion of becoming a criminal, and not just
any criminal, but a bank robber. I identify with his yearning to be something
“great” and with his humorous indecisiveness, so different from the stereotype
of the lawbreaker. I also appreciate the way this case fits its locale,
30

People v. Staples, 85 Cal. Rptr. 589, 590 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
Id.
32 Id. at 591.
33 Id.
34 See DAVID SIMMONS, THE ANTI-HERO IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL: FROM JOSEPH HELLER TO KURT
VONNEGUT 4 (2008) (describing the “incongruity between mundane circumstance and heroic ideal” that the
anti-hero embodies (quoting Louis D. Rubin Jr., The Great American Joke, in WHAT’S SO FUNNY? HUMOR IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 107, 113 (Nancy A. Walker ed., 1998))).
31
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California—the state where, back in the fifties and sixties, people moved to
reinvent themselves.35 The bank Mr. Staples planned to rob was even located
in Hollywood, the city of “make-believe.”
This case is interesting from a legal point of view as well. It raises the
question of whether the culpable mental state, mens rea, must be, as it is
usually considered, an all-or-nothing concept. In my own life, certainly, there
have been occasions when I took quite a few steps toward a goal to which I
was not fully committed.36 I think of the time when I was in love with Pavel,
my first serious boyfriend. A citizen of what was then Czechoslovakia, Pavel
had come to this country on a student visa to earn his doctorate. But a year
into our love affair, his visa expired, and—out of loyalty to his brother, a
Communist Party official—he returned to his own country. Soon afterwards,
he wrote a letter asking me to move there and marry him.
At first, I acted as though I were willing to go. I gave up my rented room
in Manhattan, sold my typewriter and cherished books, and reserved a seat on a
flight to Prague. Then I traveled to Washington, D.C., and applied for a visa at
the Czechoslovakian embassy. But when it proved impossible to obtain one—
Pavel said his brother had blacklisted me—I balked at taking the final step. In
letter after letter, Pavel begged me to fly to Paris and get a visa there, but I
couldn’t bring myself to go. By that time, my family had weighed in with fear,
35

See, e.g., HOWARD KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND 163 (1989) (describing
migrants as “people in search of self-transformation”); LAURENCE RICKELS, THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA (1991)
(discussing California as the state of self reinvention); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, Contested Eden, in CONTESTED
EDEN: CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH 1 (Ramón A. Gutiérrez & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1998) (“In the
Golden State, one generation after another has found a tangible place on which to project its myths and
fantasies of utopic possibility.”); Moses Rischin, Immigration, Migration, and Minorities in California: A
Reassessment, 41 PAC. HIST. REV. 71, 75 (1972) (providing statistics for California’s population growth
between 1950 and 1970).
36 The use of personal narrative in scholarly writing has become increasingly popular in recent decades.
For a good summary of this trend as of the early 1980s, see Fredericka Randall, Why Scholars Become
Storytellers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1984, § 7 at 1, 31. For a thoughtful argument supporting the use of personal
stories in scholarship, see ROBERT J. NASH, LIBERATING SCHOLARLY WRITING: THE POWER OF PERSONAL
NARRATIVE (2004). For examples of personal narrative in legal scholarship, see STEPHEN L. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, HOW DID YOU GET TO BE
MEXICAN? (1999); JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN (1995); Martha Grace Duncan,
“So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1469, 1470 (2002); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–89 (1986); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1710–11 (1993); and Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
For general assessments of storytelling in legal writing, see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and
Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); and
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanne Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807 (1993).
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worry, and frantic questions about what would happen to my graduate school
fellowship if I were to leave the country. I realized I wasn’t willing to give up
my studies and freedom in the United States to join Pavel in an uncertain
future behind the Iron Curtain. What’s more, I think I knew this all along.
In the same way, I suspect that Mr. Staples’s mens rea for bank robbery
was not full-blown; rather, as one distinguished criminal law treatise has
suggested, he could be viewed as a “Walter Mitty type who fantasized about
the perfect crime but never really formed an intent to burglarize the bank.”37
Notwithstanding the ambiguity about his intent and his change of heart about
the robbery, Staples’s conviction was upheld.38 While this result may seem
shocking, it has a bona fide explanation in law. At trial, the court apparently
refused to believe that Staples had desisted from the crime voluntarily and
instead concluded that he had been motivated by the threat of detection.39 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that, regardless of motive,
abandonment is no defense at common law.40 After the crime of attempt has
been completed, regrets are irrelevant. They have no more bearing on guilt for
attempt than they have on guilt for the target offense, once the crime has been
consummated.41
III. DREAMING OF SIMPLER TIMES: ROMANTIC THEMES IN CRIMINAL LAW
If some cases inspire a fascination through their remarkable defendants,
others take your breath away with their stately eloquence. I think immediately
of Morissette v. United States.42 A David-and-Goliath story, this Michigan
case involves a scrap-iron collector who, in the autumn of 1948, removed some
spent bomb casings from Air Force property. The rusted casings had been
lying out in the weather for years, and Joe Morissette, thinking they had been
discarded, took them away and sold them for eighty-four dollars.43
The Air Force brought charges, urging that it made no difference whether
Mr. Morissette thought the junk abandoned inasmuch as the relevant statute
was silent on the culpable mental state.44 In contrast, counsel for the defense
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 11.5(b)(1).
Staples, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id.
342 U.S. 246 (1951).
Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 264.
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argued that “the taking must have been with a felonious intent.”45 The case
was appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held it necessary
for the prosecution to show that Morissette had a guilty mind—that he believed
the property still belonged to someone else—to convict him of theft.46 Based
on this holding, the Court exonerated Morissette.47
Morissette’s victory over the Air Force, like David’s over Goliath, evokes a
certain Oedipal delight. Yet, to me, the most moving aspect of this case is not
Morissette’s exculpation but rather the contrast between the petitioner’s low
status and relatively trivial acts, on the one hand, and the elegant grandeur and
high significance of the opinion, on the other. The Supreme Court itself
highlights this discrepancy in its opening sentence: “This would have remained
a profoundly insignificant case to all except its immediate parties had it
not . . . raise[d] questions both fundamental and far-reaching . . . .”48
The opinion, written by Justice Jackson, contains some of the most
gorgeously crafted language in all of criminal law. I especially admire the
following lines, with their masterful use of antithesis and cadenced rhythms:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
49
individual to choose between good and evil.

Here, in just two sentences, the Court transforms a case concerning a junk
dealer and an alleged theft of eighty-four dollars into something solemn and
majestic.
The sentence that begins the next paragraph is equally melodic: “Crime, as
a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evilmeaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.”50 Here again,
Justice Jackson expertly employs rhetorical devices—in particular, alliteration
and synecdoche—to create beauty and persuasive power. Instead of the usual
terms of art, mens rea and actus reus, Justice Jackson uses the more concrete
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 249.
Id. at 247–73.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
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expressions, “an evil-meaning mind” and “an evil-doing hand.” And, after
numerous Latinate terms, he achieves the sense of an ending by using
monosyllabic Anglo-Saxon words in the phrase “deep and early root in
American soil.” This final image, drawn from nature, announces a Romantic
motif that runs throughout the opinion, most strikingly in Justice Jackson’s
history of mens rea, the requirement of the guilty mind.51
In that history, Justice Jackson explains that as urban life and industrial
jobs supplanted an agrarian lifestyle, a new category of crimes evolved to
protect people in this more interdependent world. Because of the difficulty in
proving intent on the part of a corporation president whose company sells
adulterated food, or a landlord who maintains substandard housing, the new
crimes dispensed with the traditional mens rea requirement. As Justice
Jackson writes: “The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen
exposed to injury . . . . Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called
for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. . . . Such
dangers have engendered increasingly numerous . . . regulations . . . .”52
Idealizing preindustrial times, Justice Jackson presents them as a simpler
era when people could not even dream of the highly regulated lives we lead
today. He associates this “simpler” era with the doctrine of mens rea that the
Court wishes to uphold. Conversely, the opinion links the new criminal
offenses—those that dispense with the need to show an “evil-meaning
mind”—with the complexities and dangers of modern life. While some might
contend that cities and industries facilitate levels of happiness and fulfillment
superior to those that were possible in an agrarian era, Justice Jackson evokes
the Romantic motif of the Golden Age to enhance the appeal of the Court’s
holding.53
Having explained how it came about that some offenses lack the mens rea
requirement, Justice Jackson goes on to argue that the state should be obliged
to prove intent whenever the crime carries a substantial moral opprobrium, or

51

For discussions of nature as a Romantic theme, see J.A. CUDDON, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS
LITERARY THEORY 813, 815 (3d. rev. ed. 1991) (defining Romanticism); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1970 (2002) (describing Romanticism as “marked
esp[ecially] in English literature by . . . an appreciation and often a worship of external nature”).
52 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253–54 (emphasis added).
53 See generally HANS BIEDERMANN, DICTIONARY OF SYMBOLISM 155 (James Hulbert trans., Penguin
Books 1994) (1989) (describing golden age as a “symbol” based on “the conviction that in earlier times
humanity had immediate access to the sources of knowledge” and suggesting that this symbol stems from the
greater intensity of childhood experience).
AND
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stigma. Once again, Justice Jackson uses alliteration to deepen his words’
effectiveness: “Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents . . . stir a
sense of insecurity in the whole community and . . . the infamy is that of a
felony, which . . . is ‘as bad a word as you can give to man or thing.’”54
Playfully, Justice Jackson employs the Latinate words infamy and felony, then
repeats the concept of infamy in plain Anglo-Saxon: “as bad a word as you can
give to man or thing.”
In the opinion’s penultimate sentence, the Court returns to the theme of
stigma. If the jury had been correctly instructed in the law, Justice Jackson
writes, it might have “refused to brand Morissette as a thief.”55 And thus we
come full circle, back to the scrap dealer whose fate was at stake when this
seminal opinion began.
IV. REPETITION AND CONTRAST: THE ELEGANT RHYTHM OF CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law can make you feel smart and competent. And the doctrine
that is likely to make you feel smartest and most competent is the felonymurder rule. This rule allows a person to be convicted of murder without any
intent to kill, knowledge that death will occur, or even recklessness. If the
prosecutor can establish that the death occurred in furtherance of another
felony (usually a dangerous one), then the malice required for murder can be
posited rather than proved. In this way, the felony-murder rule dispenses with
the centuries-old mens rea requirement and can lead to punishment
disproportionate to the crime.56
Although I disapprove of the felony-murder doctrine, I enjoy teaching and
discussing it. I like its wrinkles upon wrinkles and exceptions upon
exceptions, its obscure rules known only to the initiates, the cognoscenti. So
esoteric are the doctrines of felony murder that even my fellow law professors
have usually forgotten them unless they work in criminal law. When I feel left
out of their discussions about corporate finance and sports antitrust, I simply
54 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260 (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (1899)).
55 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
56 For criticisms of the felony-murder rule, see Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder
Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 478–85 (1985) (arguing that if the
felony-murder rule eliminates malice, it violates the Eighth Amendment requirement of proportionality);
James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That Shape Our
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1457 (1994) (referring to the felony-murder rule’s
“infringement of our fundamental philosophy of fault and punishment”).
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bring up the agency limitation to felony murder57 and the shield exception to
the agency theory.58 Sometimes, I’ll ask them, “Do you think the merger
doctrine should limit felony murder when the predicate felony is burglary and
the ‘felony therein’ is assault with a deadly weapon?”59 They won’t have a
clue that such a sophisticated issue even exists. I tell my students, “This is
great for impressing your friends at cocktail parties!”
The felony-murder case I like best is People v. Taylor,60 a 1970 California
case involving a getaway driver, Alvin Taylor, whose accomplices, James
Daniels and John Smith, attempted to rob a liquor store owned by Mr. and Mrs.
West. During the holdup, Smith reportedly “looked intent and apprehensive,”
while Daniels “chattered insanely . . . telling Mr. West ‘Put the money in the
bag. Put the money in the bag. . . . Don’t move or I’ll blow your head
off. . . . Get down on the floor.’”61 While the robbery was in progress, the
store owners inflicted fatal gunshot wounds on Smith. Mrs. West shot Daniels
as well, but he managed to leave the store and survived. Throughout these
events, Taylor remained in the car. Under the felony-murder doctrine, the state
charged both Taylor and Daniels with murder for the death of Smith at the
hands of the store owners.62 Although Daniels was tried separately, the jury’s
decision in his trial would affect Taylor’s fate.63
What makes Taylor an absorbing case is its aesthetic richness of repetition
and contrast as the state charges Taylor again and again, always with a
different legal argument, until the case is finally resolved. In the first round,
on appeal from the murder charge, the Supreme Court of California rejects the
57 For the classic explanation of the agency theory, see Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen)
541, 544 (1863): “No person can be held guilty of a homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively
his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting in concert
with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.”
58 According to the shield exception, the agency theory is “inapplicable to a case where defendants
forced deceased to occupy a place of danger in order that they might carry out the crime.” State v. Canola, 374
A.2d 20, 26 (N.J. 1977).
59 To serve as a predicate felony to bootstrap up to murder under the felony-murder rule, a crime must
have an independent felonious purpose. See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969). There is no
problem using burglary as the predicate felony where the “felony therein” that the burglar contemplates is a
property offense. However, if the “felony therein” is an assault with intent to kill, a California court has held
that the burglary merges with the murder and thus cannot be used to support a felony-murder conviction. See
People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22, 26 (Cal. 1969). Other courts have held to the contrary. See, e.g., People v.
Miller, 661 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (N.Y. 1995).
60 Taylor v. Super. Ct., 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
61 Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id. at 132–33.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 70–72.
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felony-murder doctrine based on the agency-theory exception that California
had previously adopted; neither Taylor nor his agent (accomplice) did the
shooting.64
But the prosecutors do not give up easily. Rather, they then propose
another legal justification for charging Taylor with murder: a combination of
depraved-heart doctrine and accomplice liability. In other words, they argue
that Taylor could be held vicariously responsible for the “conscious disregard
for life” shown by his two accomplices in their attempt to rob the store.65 The
prosecution faces a problem here because, in a previous case involving a silent
robber, the same court held that mere armed robbery, without additional
provocation, was not sufficient to establish “wanton disregard for human life”
such that the robbers would be guilty of murder if someone died.66 The court
has to overrule the earlier case or somehow distinguish the facts in Taylor.
It opts for the latter. The court stresses that the two felons in the store,
Smith and Daniels, went further than the silent robber in the earlier case by
doing things that made the robbery exceptionally dangerous. In particular, the
court emphasizes Smith’s “nervous apprehension” and Daniels’s “coercive
conduct toward Mr. West and his repeated threats.”67 Having distinguished
Taylor from the “silent robber” case, the court finds that Taylor can be charged
with murder based on the “conscious disregard for human life” shown by his
two accomplices.68 Following this ruling, Taylor is tried by a jury and
convicted of both robbery and murder.69 The prosecution wins, and there is no
reason to think that further developments will be forthcoming.
Nevertheless, Taylor’s murder conviction is eventually overturned, and for
an unusual reason. It so happens that Taylor’s accomplice, Daniels, when tried
separately for the same murder, was acquitted.70 Based on this inconsistent
verdict—and the doctrine of collateral estoppel71—Taylor again appeals, and
this time he wins. The California Supreme Court reasons that it would
“compromis[e] . . . the integrity of the judicial system” to allow Taylor’s
conviction to stand when that conviction was based on the behavior of an
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Taylor, 477 P.2d at 133.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 134; see also id. at 138–39 (Peters, J., dissenting).
Id. at 134–35 (majority opinion).
Id. at 135.
People v. Taylor, 527 P.2d 622, 623 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
Id. at 624.
For a discussion of collateral estoppel as applied to this case, see id. at 625–27.
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exonerated accomplice.72 When I teach this case in class, I foreshadow this
reversal of fortune by telling my students that Taylor gets off on the murder
charge. Aiming for a cliff-hanger, I don’t tell them why—until next time.
V. IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO: THE SENSUALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law is sensual. It stirs all the senses—touch, smell, taste, sight,
and sound—but in me it excites the auditory sense most of all. I like the hard
“k” sound of words like exculpate and culpable and the definitive, flattening
sound of the word quashed, the last word in any British case where a
conviction is overturned. Though now used to mean “make void” or
“annulled,” the word quashed derives from a root meaning “shatter.”73 To
highlight the onomatopoeia, I pronounce it with fanfare, as if I were literally
shattering the guilty verdict: “Quashed!”
Another term in criminal law that affords auditory pleasure is in flagrante
delicto. Literally, the expression means “in the blaze of the transgression”;74
however, it is used broadly to mean “[i]n the very act of committing a crime or
other wrong.”75 In judicial opinions, the phrase typically appears when a man
has been charged with murder for killing his wife, her lover, or both. To
mitigate the crime, the man may claim that he acted in “heat of passion” after
discovering his wife in flagrante delicto.76 No matter how often we hear the
expression, my students and I can’t help giggling at the courts’ referring to
adultery with these quaint Latin words.
A word you seldom see outside of law these days is wanton. I smile at its
unabashed judgmental quality and the sounds of the two syllables that are
almost, but not quite, identical—a sort of internal “slant” rhyme, as they say in

72

Id. at 628.
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note †, at 2035.
74 JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 32 (1984).
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 2004) (defining in flagrante delicto).
76 See, e.g., Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (describing an attorney’s
“emotional plea on behalf of [the] petitioner based upon finding his wife in flagrante delicto”); State v. Larkin,
157 S.W. 600, 608 (Mo. 1913) (stating that “even if the deceased had discovered his wife . . . in flagrante
delicto, . . . he would not go acquit” (emphasis added)); State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987)
(where a man killed his wife’s paramour after discovering the couple in flagrante delicto, the crime was held
“a classic case of voluntary manslaughter”); Williams v. State, 165 S.W. 583, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914)
(using the phrase in flagrante delicto only in a West headnote but also holding that where “appellant’s mind
was so aroused by the act of intercourse he had seen, . . . and he killed his wife . . . he might not be guilty of
anything higher than manslaughter”).
73
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poetics.77 The unexpected stress on the first syllable gives me a chance to joke
with my students: “It’s pronounced ‘wanton,’” I tell them. “Not like the
Chinese soup.” As to the word’s meaning, my favorite definition is that
provided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: “The words ‘wanton’
and ‘reckless’ are practically synonymous . . . although the word ‘wanton’ may
contain a suggestion of arrogance or insolence or heartlessness that is lacking
in the word ‘reckless.’”78
To me, the mental states of wantonness and recklessness are more
intriguing than the rather straightforward mens rea of intent and knowledge.
This may be because I have personally witnessed many reckless and even
wanton acts committed by a basically good, generous person—my father. One
of these acts happened when I was a toddler, during our family’s three-year
sojourn on a dairy farm in Northeast Pennsylvania. Winters were terribly cold
there, and one morning in February, upon discovering the water pipes frozen in
the barn, my father decided to thaw them with a blowtorch. Stacks of hay
lined the inside walls of the barn to keep the cows warm, and my mother
worried that a spark from the blowtorch might land in the hay, causing a fire.
But when she expressed her fears, my father became furious at her lack of faith
in him and proceeded with his plan.
On the afternoon of that same day, our barn caught on fire and burned to
the ground. In the blaze, our cat, horse, and small herd of dairy cows died. I
had named those cows, and my father had loved them, but now, with the help
of a hired man, he had to drag their carcasses to a trench for burial. That night,
my mother found my father crying in the attic. “It was horrible for him,” she
says, “horrible.” This is what I think about when teaching the wanton and
reckless crimes.
VI. TAPPING THE BASIC STREAM: ALLUSIONS TO POLITICAL THEORY IN
CRIMINAL LAW
“Before the beautiful,” writes theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, “no, not
really before but within the beautiful—the whole person quivers.”79 Criminal
law can make you quiver with its beautiful language and concepts. Take for
77 Also known as an “off rhyme,” a slant rhyme is defined as an “imperfect rhyme, often using assonance
or consonance only.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1256 (3d ed. 1992).
78 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944).
79 1 HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, THE GLORY OF THE LORD: A THEOLOGICAL AESTHETICS (SEEING THE
FORM) 247 (Joseph Fessio S.J. & John Riches eds., Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis trans., 1982) (1969).
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instance In re Gault,80 a case about a fifteen-year-old boy who allegedly made
some lewd phone calls to a neighbor, asking her, “Do you give any?,” “Are
your cherries ripe today?,” and “Do you have big bombers?”81 Based on this
incident, along with a few other nuisance phone calls and the alleged theft of a
baseball glove that never materialized into a formal accusation, the juvenile
judge found Gault to be a “delinquent child” and committed him to a state
industrial school until age twenty-one.82
Following a lengthy appeals process, the case went up on a habeas corpus
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of Gault.83 In its
revolutionary opinion, the Court granted certain procedural rights to minors
who are charged with a crime and threatened with a loss of liberty.
Specifically, it granted the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.84
Written by Justice Fortas, the majority opinion runs fifty-nine pages; one
paragraph, in particular, fills me with awe.
The paragraph appears in the Court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.85 At the beginning of this passage, Justice
Fortas tips his hat to the conventional explanation of the privilege: “The
privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably
trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are
reliable expressions of the truth.”86 He then contrasts this popular view with
what he sees as a truer understanding: “The roots of the privilege are, however,
far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle
because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual’s attornment to the
state and—in a philosophical sense—insists upon the equality of the individual
and the state.”87
One of the most moving passages in all of criminal law, this paragraph
works subliminally through its numerous Romantic images. Some of these

80

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
PAUL OMOJO OMAJI, RESPONDING TO YOUTH CRIME 66 (2003) (quoting the boy’s alleged language,
which is not included in the Supreme Court opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–8.
83 Id. at 59.
84 Id. at 33, 41, 55–56.
85 Id. at 47.
86 Id.
87 Id.
81
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images derive from nature, such as fruits, roots, and stream. Another comes
from the feudal past: the lovely word attornment, which means “the act of a
feudatory, vassal, or tenant by which he consents upon the alienation of an
estate to receive a new lord or superior and transfers to him his homage and
service.”88 This euphonious, largely forgotten word enchants me, as does the
way Justice Fortas revives the metaphor, comparing the relationship between
serf and lord in the medieval era to the relationship between citizen and state in
our own time. Like the pastoral imagery of fruits, roots, and stream, the word
attornment, too, reflects the Romantic ethos, for it was the Romantics who
expressed a wistfulness for the past and for the Middle Ages in particular.89
The exquisite language of the passage quoted above fits its remarkable
idea: that the individual and the state are, “in a philosophical sense,” equal.90
Justice Fortas elaborates on this point at the end of the paragraph: “One of
[the] purposes [of the Fifth Amendment privilege] is to prevent the state,
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind
and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to
decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”91
These words are, of course, solidly founded on seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century political philosophy, in particular, the social contract
theory.92 According to this theory, individuals are the primal unit, preceding
both society and the state. Originally existing in a “state of nature,”93 their
lives are “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”;94 to protect themselves
they enter into a contract, surrendering some freedom in exchange for security.
And, since the whole point of the contract is self-preservation, they are under

88

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 141 (3d ed. 1986).
See ALICE CHANDLER, A DREAM OF ORDER: THE MEDIEVAL IDEAL IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH
LITERATURE 7 (1970) (describing “medievalism” as “a part of that vast intellectual and emotional response to
change which we . . . denominate Romanticism”); see also id. at 51 (referring to medievalism’s “Romantic
origins”); H. W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 453–54 (1969) (describing the “late-eighteenth-century vogue for
medieval tales of adventure,” “the long-neglected ‘Gothick’ past,” and the Romantic “worship[]” of the
Middle Ages).
90 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
91 Id.
92 Earlier in the opinion, Justice Fortas explicitly uses the term “social compact” when explaining the
importance of due process. Id. at 20. For a discussion of the social contract in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau,
see 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 376 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
93 C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to LEVIATHAN 9, 42, 43 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
94 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 107 (Oskar Piest ed., 1958) (1651).
89
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no obligation to obey the state when it no longer protects them.95 Even
Hobbes, who, after living through the English Civil Wars, had become an
ardent proponent of authoritarianism, bows to this logic. In Leviathan, he
writes, “[I]f the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill,
wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, . . . yet has that
man the liberty to disobey.”96 As a graduate student in political science, I
imagined the man “disobeying” by running desperately for his life while an
army pursued him. Re-reading Hobbes today, decades later, I am surprised to
find no such scene in the text, so deeply is it engraved in my own mind.
VII. OF JOURNEYS AND LABYRINTHS: THE USES OF ARCHETYPE IN CRIMINAL
LAW
At first blush, the crime of attempt may appear a little dull. And it is true
that attempt crimes (being, by definition, unconsummated) often lack the
drama of, say, a premeditated murder or voluntary manslaughter. In one case,
a man merely walking along a street and leaning on a stop sign opposite a
woman’s house was convicted of “attempt to commit an assault with intent to
rape.”97 In another illustration, Father Daniel Berrigan was convicted of
attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison “without the knowledge
and consent” of the warden.98 However, his conviction was overturned on
appeal because the warden had known of the smuggling all along.99
While the facts of attempted crimes are often pedestrian, their required
elements tend to be murky. The doctrine states that defendants are innocent
when their behavior constitutes “mere preparation” but guilty when their acts
take them across an imaginary line into attempt.100 To determine whether the
defendant has crossed this line, judges and legislators employ a variety of tests.
Depending on the jurisdiction, defendants may be found guilty if they are in
“dangerous proximity”101 to the target crime, if they have taken the “last
95 See GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 435, 494 (4th ed. 1973) (describing the
conditional character of obedience in Hobbes and Locke).
96 HOBBES, supra note 94, at 176.
97 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
98 United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188–89 (3d Cir. 1973).
99 Id.
100 See King v. Barker, [1924] 43 N.Z.L.R. 865, 873 (C.A.) (discussing the distinction between “acts of
attempt and acts of preparation”).
101 People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927) (quoting with approval Justice Holmes’s language
from Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912), “There must be dangerous proximity to success”
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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step,”102 or one “substantial step,”103 or if they no longer retain a “locus
poenitentiae,” a place of repentance.104 In a graceful explanation of the locus
poenitentiae test, a Missouri court writes, “Anywhere between the conception
of the intent and the overt act toward its commission, there is room for
repent[a]nce; and the law in its beneficence extends the hand of
forgiveness.”105
Because of its elusiveness, the doctrine of attempt tends to be an acquired
taste, if it becomes a taste at all. Personally, I have learned to savor attempt, in
part by thinking about its actus reus in terms of Jungian archetypes. Implicitly,
all the tests rely on the archetype of the journey,106 but instead of knights on a
quest for the Holy Grail, the protagonists here are would-be criminals on a
quest for property to steal or a victim to rob, rape, or kill. A particular variant
of the journey archetype is that of the labyrinth or maze, the image of the
“wandering path,”107 and this variant, too, appears in the law of attempt—for
example, in the classic 1927 case of People v. Rizzo.108 Rizzo concerns four
men who drive around the Bronx all day looking for a man named Rao.109 The
men plan to rob Rao of a payroll, and two of them carry firearms for this
purpose.110 However, their erratic behavior attracts the attention of the police,
who follow and arrest them. Eventually, all four men are found guilty of
attempted robbery.111
Addressing the appeal of Rizzo’s conviction, the New York Court of
Appeals first compliments the police force for its “excellent work,” and then
adds, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, “It is a great satisfaction to realize that we have
such wide-awake guardians of our peace.”112 Almost immediately, however,
102

Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. at 873.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
104 Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. at 875.
105 State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883).
106 See NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 118 (1957) (describing the “quest or journey” as one of
the symbols whose “communicable power . . . is potentially unlimited”).
107 See PENELOPE REED DOOB, THE IDEA OF THE LABYRINTH: FROM CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY THROUGH
THE MIDDLE AGES 98 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M. L. von Franz, The Process of
Individuation, in MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 158, 170 (Carl G. Jung ed., 1964) (describing the “maze of strange
passages, chambers, and unlocked exits . . . [as] a well-known symbol of the unconscious with its unknown
possibilities”). For a detailed discussion of the “labyrinth” as a literary symbol, see MICHAEL FERBER, A
DICTIONARY OF LITERARY SYMBOLS 102–04 (1999).
108 158 N.E. 888, 888 (N.Y. 1927).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
103
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the court begins to reason that there was no attempt because the four men were
still too far away from the target crime. Highlighting the absurdity of
prosecuting these defendants for their bootless venture, the court says, “The
defendants had not found or seen the man they intended to rob. . . . The four
men intended to rob the payroll man, whoever he was. They were looking for
him, but they had not seen or discovered him up to the time they were
arrested.”113 In the end, the appellate court exonerates Rizzo,114 but despite the
happy outcome, the case leaves me with a bleak feeling. The four men’s vain
expedition reminds me of Beckett’s line in Waiting for Godot: “Nothing
happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful!”115
On first acquaintance, attempt comes across as an esoteric offense, less
familiar than murder, robbery, or burglary. But, on reflection, we see that this
crime is all around us, even in the Bible. One of the most moving biblical
stories, the testing of Abraham, could be seen as an attempted murder. As
recounted in the book of Genesis, God tests Abraham’s faith by ordering him
to kill his first-born son, Isaac.116 We are told that Abraham had “laid the
wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the
wood.”117 He even “took the knife to slay his son”118 before the angel of the
Lord intervened, saying, “Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any
thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not
withheld thy son, thine only son from me.”119 Impressive as Abraham’s
devotion is by a theological standard, by any legal standard, Abraham went
beyond “mere preparation” and fulfilled the actus reus of attempted murder.
And whereas a good defense attorney might argue “abandonment”—a defense
available in some jurisdictions that have modernized their codes—this
argument would be unlikely to prevail because the abandonment must be
voluntary,120 whereas here it was coerced by the angel.
Psychologically, an even more complex tale of attempt is the story of
David and King Saul, which appears in The First Book of Samuel.121 At the
beginning of the narrative, King Saul dearly loves David, the shepherd boy
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 890.
SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT 28 (Samuel Beckett trans., Grove Press 1954).
Genesis 22:1–:19 (King James).
Id. at 22:9.
Id. at 22:10.
Id. at 22:12.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962).
1 Samuel 16:1–31:13 (King James).
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who plays the lyre to soothe Saul’s “evil spirit.”122 In time, however, the King
becomes jealous and afraid of his protégé.123 Driven by the evil spirit, he
throws a javelin at David and repeatedly orders his servants to kill him.124
After each of these attempts, the King renounces his criminal purpose, but the
evil spirit always comes upon him again.125 In the end, Saul, ashamed, vows to
let David live,126 but after so many reversals David doubts the permanence of
the King’s change of heart.127 This story illustrates the risk courts face in
allowing an abandonment defense—namely, that the defendant who has once
shown his dangerousness may decide to try again.128
I myself was once the victim of an attempted crime. The incident happened
in two countries, Venezuela and Colombia, soon after my twenty-first birthday.
At the time, I was living and studying in Bogotá on a research fellowship from
my college in the United States. Being required to renew my visa from outside
the country, I had flown to San Antonio del Táchira, an unbearably hot, dry
Venezuelan border town overrun with mosquitoes and seemingly devoid of
culture. After completing the paperwork for my visa renewal, I saw no reason
to remain on the barren frontier and wanted to return immediately to Bogotá. I
was low on cash, as was usual with me in those days, and I started looking for
a bus or other inexpensive transportation to the airport in Cúcuta, on the
Colombian side.
At a taxi stand, one of the drivers whom I approached for information
offered me a free ride, and though I should have known better, my need to hold
onto my dwindling funds overpowered my judgment. He urged that I sit in
front with him instead of in back, and I foolishly acquiesced. The next thing I
remember is that we were traveling fast on the highway, and he was talking in
a leering tone about my lips, “Tiene unos labios . . . .” I turned away and
grasped the handle of the door, as though about to jump from the moving cab.
But he, immediately reading my thoughts, grabbed my upper arm and held it in
a strong grip. “¡No se bote; no se bote!” he said. “Don’t throw yourself out!”
122

Id. at 16:21 to :23.
Id. at 18:5–11.
124 Id. at 18:11, 19:1, 19:10, 19:11.
125 See id. at 19:4 to :11, 24:1 to :19, 26:21.
126 Id. at 26:21.
127 Id. at 27:1.
128 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1968) (stipulating that the renunciation is incomplete if “motivated by
a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to
another but similar objective or victim”); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 195 (1978)
(“[W]here the defense is operative, it is critical that the actor definitively abandon his criminal plan.”).
123

DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

9/10/2010 10:25 AM

BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT

1225

We had been riding for what seemed like fifteen or twenty minutes when
he exited the highway and turned onto a dirt road. After driving about 150 feet
into an orange grove, he stopped the car. He pulled me toward him with a
rough gesture and started to kiss me.
My response was instinctive: I bit him hard on the lips, causing him to
shriek with surprise and pain. In that moment, he loosened his grip. Taking
advantage of my chance, I opened the door and fled to the main street, where I
shouted, “¡Auxilio! ¡Auxilio! ¡Ayúdame por favor!” until a lady stopped for
me.
The lady took me to a cattle ranch where the owners offered me a place to
stay until my passport and other belongings could be recovered. Each day, in
the searing heat, my hosts drove me to the headquarters of DAS, the
Colombian police, to discuss the progress of the investigation. On one
occasion, an officer sat me down at a table to search through mugshots of
known criminals in the area, but I could find no match for my assailant. Had
his photograph been there, I would surely have spotted it, for he had a
countenance that was striking in its unsightliness—a face as “ugly as sin.” But
perhaps ugliness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder,129 and my attacker’s
supposedly hideous visage was merely my own fear and revulsion projected
onto him.
VIII. LETTERS FROM PRISON: BEAUTY AS MEANS OF TRANSCENDENCE IN
CRIMINAL LAW
As we view the sense of beauty through the psychoanalytic lens, we
see in it man’s search for perfection, transcendence, and hope.
George Hagman, Aesthetic Experience130

From the fifth century, B.C.E., until the eighteenth century, A.D., most
philosophers regarded beauty as objective—a quality that inhered in the thing
observed, with ideal proportions that could be studied and known.131
Beginning in the Romantic era, however, this “Great Theory”132 gradually

129

For discussions of ugliness from a psychoanalytic perspective, see GEORGE HAGMAN, AESTHETIC
EXPERIENCE 103–22 (2005); and RICKMAN, supra note 1, at 68–89.
130 HAGMAN, supra note 129, at 101.
131 See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, The Great Theory of Beauty and Its Decline, 31 J. AESTHETICS & ART
CRITICISM 165, 167 (1972).
132 See id.
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yielded to the view that beauty is both objective and subjective—a quality of
the object, yes, but also of the person observing133 or, as George Hagman has
written, something “in the space between . . . the potential space . . . ‘the area
of yearning’ in which we attempt to conjure up the sense of an ideal world and
an ideal self.”134
For confirmation of this theory that beauty is partly subjective, the
expression of a “yearning” for perfection and transcendence, we need search
no further than the letters of my friend Ed. Although Ed and I have never met
in person, or even spoken on the telephone, I feel I know him through the long
letters he has written me, the photographs he has sent, and the newspaper
articles and court documents I have read. Smart, disciplined, and intellectually
curious, Ed is also a little arrogant and insecure. I attribute the arrogance to the
insecurity. He’s embarrassed—mortified, he would say—about being a
prisoner. Incarcerated at age sixteen for shooting two men, one of whom
remains paralyzed below the waist, Ed has spent just over half his life in
prison.135 He tells me that he understands all too well what the average person
thinks of inmates.
For example, there was the time I stopped writing to Ed after he begged me
to get him out. Because I was not admitted to the Bar in his state, and doubted
my ability to improve his life in any practical way, I had clarified the limits of
our relationship at the outset. When he wrote again after my months of
silence, Ed acknowledged his mistake with self-effacing class: “I’m feeling
inappropriate . . . .
We agreed when we first started our
correspondence . . . that you weren’t able to help me . . . . I hope that the letter
did not suddenly alter the neat correspondence we’ve been sharing.”136
Another time, I sent him a Christmas card with my home address on the
envelope. In his next letter, Ed wrote that, not knowing the extent of our
friendship, he assumed I had made a mistake. Thus, he reported, he had
destroyed the envelope immediately and made a point of responding to my
office address. “I always worry,” he explained, “that I’m going to
inadvertently overstep a boundry [sic] and you’ll think ‘inmate alert.’”137

133

See id. at 174.
HAGMAN, supra note 129, at 97.
135 For a detailed discussion of Ed’s crime and behavior after his arrest, see Duncan, supra note 36, at
1507–12.
136 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 5 (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
137 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 2–3 (Jan. 29, 2008) (on file with author).
134
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Ed is a serious student. He has read everything that I have published
during the ten years of our correspondence, including a long scholarly article
and several personal memoirs, as well as a book I had written before we met.
Sometimes, he recommends books to me or critiques my work, asking
pertinent questions and making thoughtful suggestions about commas and
question marks.138 For example, when he read my law review article “So
Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the
Law, an article in which Ed himself is one of the featured defendants, he asked
why I hadn’t used a question mark after the word Untender, as Shakespeare
does in the original phrase from King Lear.139 Given the argument I was
making, he was right; the question mark would have made more sense.
Several years ago, Ed began studying Shakespeare because he liked the
quotations from the plays that he noticed in my book. In one letter, he wrote:
Well . . . you’ve set me off on an amazing course with the
Shakespeare . . . . I am deep into it, and I’ve devised a system of
study which allows me to break a play completely apart and analyze
it, in my search for what I’m looking for, which is ultimately Myself.
I’ve bought into the theory that within Shakespeare’s complete works
lies the complete range of the human condition, and that we are all
just shades of various characters . . . . I believe a mastery of them all
140
will equal a mastery of yourself.

Reading this letter for the first time, I was amazed by Ed’s resilience in the
face of his lengthy incarceration. Notwithstanding years spent in solitary
confinement, he retains the ability to respond with awe, idealization, and hope.
Ed’s gift for transcendence shines through again in his letters from a
“supermax” prison where he and the other inmates were never allowed out of
doors. “I fantasize,” he wrote, “about . . . smelling grass or rain clouds, or
hear[ing] and feel[ing] wind all around me, or smell[ing] leaves, or dirt or tree
bark.”141 [D]o yourself a favor,” he added. “[F]eel[] wind all around you.”142

138

See, e.g., Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 1 (Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with author); Letter from
Edward A. Tilley to author 1–3 (Aug. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
139 See Duncan, supra note 36; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1.
140 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 1 (Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author).
141 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 5 (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
142 Id.
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Some time after this letter was written, the American Civil Liberties Union
brought a class action lawsuit to challenge conditions in the “supermax,”143
and Ed, along with some of his fellow prisoners, testified in court. “We all
were fascinated by the courtroom,” Ed wrote. “[Y]ou have to realize that that
was the first time I had walked on carpet for ten years[,] and that was the first
chair I had ‘experienced’ in as long (man, that chair was plush; it swiveled,
rocked, etc. and I had to restrain myself from spinning in it); plus, that was the
first time I had seen such beautiful colors in as long (rich blues, woods,
etc.) . . . .”144 Ed’s rhapsodic description of his aesthetic experience resonates
with the theory put forth by James Joyce in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young
Man. Speaking through his character Stephen Dedalus, Joyce writes that the
“esthetic emotion . . . is . . . static. The mind is arrested and raised above
desire and loathing.”145
When the plaintiffs won their suit, prison policy underwent numerous
changes, among them, the implementation of a right to exercise outside.146
After his first workout under the new regime, Ed wrote to me with joy: “I got
to smell fresh asphalt being laid from a construction project within eyesight
(man, I’d forgotten how awesome that smell is), and I’ve also smelled freshcut grass, and tractor exhaust; I’ve also felt rain and stared at clouds.”147
Related to his capacity for reverence toward the outdoors is Ed’s ability to
feel and movingly express appreciation for people. For instance, he sent me a
photograph in which his hands are cuffed, but he is smiling. On the back of
the photograph, he wrote, “This smile originated all the way back from when
we met. You’ve changed my life.”148
I realize that it takes very little to raise a prisoner’s hopes, so forgotten do
convicts feel behind the walls. Still I worry that Ed gives me too much
credit—that some day he may be disappointed in me, or even feel betrayed.
Dreading such an occurrence, I try to expose my feet of clay, but he insists his
point of view is accurate. Perhaps it is only through idealization that he is able
to transcend his circumstances, to sustain hope. For the same reason, I suspect,
he needs to view nature as astonishingly beautiful, industrial odors as
143

Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004).
Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 4 (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
145 See JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 240 (1916).
146 See Austin, 372 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment claims, related primarily to medical care and
the provision of outdoor recreation, were settled.”).
147 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 2 (Aug. 2, 2006) (on file with author).
148 Photograph on file with author.
144
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awesome, and Shakespeare’s plays as great enough to encompass all
personalities on earth.149 Idealization is, to be sure, a universal human
tendency, but in Ed it may also function as an effective defense, warding off
loneliness and despair.150
IX. “FLIGHT IS FOR SANCTUARY”151: THE MOTIF OF THE CASTLE IN CRIMINAL
LAW
Hang out our banners on the outward walls;
The cry is still “They come:” our castle’s strength
Will laugh a siege to scorn . . . .
Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Macbeth

152

In Backstage,153 one of his four essays on the writer’s craft, the Soviet
novelist and critic Yevgeny Zamyatin offers a unique and riveting perspective
on imagery, one that has guided and sustained my own writing for many years.
“I rarely use individual, chance images,” he writes. “[T]hese are only sparks,
which live for a brief moment, and then are extinguished, forgotten.”154 The
writer who uses chance images, he contends, has failed “to concentrate, to truly
see, to believe.”155 In contrast to these ephemeral “sparks,” Zamyatin
describes “integral” images,156 or “leitmotivs,”157 which emerge from the
writer’s deep conviction. Thus, he reports: “If I firmly believe in the image, it
will inevitably give rise to an entire system of related images, it will spread its
roots through paragraphs and pages.”158

149 For a discussion of the relationship between idealization and beauty, see HAGMAN, supra note 129, at
95–96. Hagman writes that beauty “results from . . . [a] dialectic between an inner readiness for idealization
and the encounter with an object that is ‘worthy’ of the projection.” Id. at 96.
150 For a discussion of “idealization” as a normal and universal tendency, see NANCY MCWILLIAMS,
PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSIS 105 (1994). For an interpretation of “idealization” as a defense mechanism, see
id. at 105–06, 173–74; see also Carlo Strenger, The Classic and the Romantic Vision in Psychoanalysis, 70
INT’L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 593, 596–600 (1989) (presenting two distinct views of idealization in
psychoanalysis).
151 People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).
152 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
153 YEVGENY ZAMYATIN, Backstage, in A SOVIET HERETIC: ESSAYS BY YEVEGNY ZAMYATIN 190 (Mirra
Ginsburg ed. & trans., 1970).
154 Id. at 198.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.

DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL

1230

9/10/2010 10:25 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

Applying Zamyatin’s dichotomy to criminal law, one finds examples of
both “chance images” and leitmotifs. Among the former, I recall with
fondness Justice Jackson’s term “chameleon-like” to describe the crime of
conspiracy;159 Judge Posner’s use of the ostrich metaphor to interpret “willful
blindness;”160 and Judge Tobriner’s reference to a particularly broad argument
by the state as “an uncharted sea of felony murder”161 on which the court
“remain[s] unwilling to embark.” More surprising and significant are the
images in which judges seem to “firmly believe”—images that have “spread
their roots”162 not only through paragraphs and pages, but also across oceans
and continents and through the centuries. As we have already seen, heat of
passion would qualify as one such leitmotif,163 and another is surely the castle.
A storied image, which figures in numerous fairy tales and historical
romances,164 the castle comes into criminal law by way of the “castle
doctrine,” an age-old exception to the “rule of retreat” in self-defense law.
“Self-defense,” courts tell us, with a beautiful maritime metaphor, “sounds
in necessity”;165 or again, with a spiritual trope: “[N]ecessity [is] the soul
of . . . self-defense . . . .”166 Derived from Latin roots meaning “not” and “to
yield,”167 the requirement of necessity flows from the assumption that life is “a
thing precious and favoured in law”;168 thus, no one may employ deadly force,
even in self-defense, unless it is exigent, or necessary. In practice, the
requirement of necessity means that the defender must believe she faces a

159 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the crime
of conspiracy as “chameleon-like” in that it “takes on a special coloration from each of the independent
offenses on which it may be overlaid”).
160 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that we interpret willful
blindness by thinking about what “real ostriches do (or at least are popularly supposed to do)”). For a
discussion of “willful blindness,” see KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 232.
161 People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 361 (Cal. 1966).
162 ZAMYATIN, supra note 153, at 198.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 10–16.
164 See, e.g., SIR WALTER SCOTT, IVANHOE (Barnes & Noble Classics, 2005) (1819); Jacob Grimm &
Wilhelm Grimm, Snow White, in THE ANNOTATED CLASSIC FAIRY TALES 79–94 (Maria Tatar ed. & trans.,
2002) [hereinafter CLASSIC FAIRY TALES]; Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, Sleeping Beauty, in CLASSIC
FAIRY TALES, supra at 95–104. Jeanne-Marie Leprince de Beaumont, Beauty and the Beast, in CLASSIC FAIRY
TALES, supra at 58–78.
165 See MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 1067 (4th ed. 2004)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the “slogan that self-defense ‘sounds’ in
necessity”).
166 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
167 See JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 261–63 (1984) (discussing words derived
from the root ne); id. at 344 (discussing words derived from the root sed).
168 Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (King’s Bench).
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threat of death or serious bodily injury; she must also perceive the threat to be
unlawful and imminent; and, finally, all her beliefs must be reasonable.169
Absent these conditions, self-defense cannot, in the elegant language of the
law, avail.170
Nonetheless, even when all these criteria are met, the defender who knows
she can retreat from the assailant and do so in complete safety, is in some
jurisdictions required to retreat.171 Actually, the whole phrase (which derives
from a time before the existence of firearms) is “retreat to the wall.”172
Emanating from a strict interpretation of necessity, the rule of retreat was a part
of self-defense doctrine at common law. But, when the common law was
introduced into this country, many jurisdictions, particularly in the South and
West, rejected the rule of retreat as cowardly,173 supplanting it with the
amusingly named “true man” doctrine. As the Supreme Court of Ohio
explained in 1876:
The law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human
nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or
even to save life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man, who
is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by
violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him
174
enormous bodily harm.

As a result of concerns about manliness and honor, the duty to retreat is
now a minority view in the United States, whereas in England it continues to
be the law of the land.175 Even in England, however, there is an exception;
namely, the privilege of non-retreat from the home, known as the castle
doctrine. As enunciated in 1847 by Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of
the Court of King’s Bench, the doctrine is as follows:
[The defender], being in his own house, need not fly as far as he can,
as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his

169

See Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1230.
See, e.g., Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
171 See State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961) (calling the principle of retreat “salutary if
reasonably limited”).
172 See GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 165, at 1070.
173 See Rachel V. Lee, A Further Erosion of the Retreat Rule in North Carolina, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1093, 1095 (1976).
174 Erwin v. Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876).
175 See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
237, 243 (2008). For an excellent discussion of the rule of retreat in historical context, see GARDNER &
SINGER, supra note 165, at 1069–72.
170
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house to excuse him from flying, for that would be to give up the
176
possession of his house to his adversary by his flight.

More than a century later, an American court reiterated the castle doctrine,
albeit with tongue-in-cheek: “[O]ur normal solicitude for the life of the
attacker,” it said, “is somewhat dampened when he chooses such historically
protected premises on which to make his murderous assault.”177
Whether the castle doctrine is fully consistent with the requirement of
necessity is debatable. On the one hand, the privilege of non-retreat from the
home seems an exception because the defender could just as easily flee from a
dwelling as from anywhere else. On the other hand, some theorists, taking
literally the old expression “retreat to the wall” argue that the defender who is
in her dwelling has reached the wall, and thus fulfilled the requirement of
necessity.178 As we noted earlier in the context of depraved heart,179 here again
we see how a metaphor that has grown tired and stale can come alive again
when studied with fresh eyes.
But suppose the assailant and the defender both live in the dwelling where
the assault occurs. In these cases, some courts hold that the castle exception
does not apply, and the defender must flee. Making a charming argument for
this view, the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote in 1981: “We cannot conclude
that the Connecticut legislature intended to sanction the reenactment of the
climactic scene from High Noon in the familial kitchens of this state.”180
Ironically, here the court draws on the very cowboy ethos that underlies the
“true man” doctrine and uses it as a reason for requiring retreat. The reference
to High Noon is especially apt because the movie’s central question is whether
ex-marshal Will Kane should leave town before the arrival of his nemesis or
risk a shootout on the streets of Hadleyville.181
Less hyperbolic, but more poetic, are cases favoring the castle doctrine
even in circumstances of co-habitation or co-ownership of property. For
example, in Jones v. State182 we see the deep roots of the castle doctrine and
176 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORNAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
486 (W.A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., 1st Am. ed. 1847).
177 Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
178 See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century,
4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL. 504, 530 (2007) (emphasis added).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 5–9.
180 State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 566 (Conn. 1981).
181 See HIGH NOON (Stanley Kramer Productions 1952).
182 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884).
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the feudal ambience it evokes. In this case concerning joint owners of a bar, a
man killed his brother-in-law in self-defense.183 The trial court instructed the
jury that because the attacker shared ownership of the very place where the
assault occurred, the defender had an obligation to retreat.184 However, on
appeal from the murder conviction, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that
the retreat rule did not apply when the defender was in his own dwelling or
place of business: “Why,” the court asked, “should one retreat from his own
house . . . ? Whither shall he flee, and how far, and when may he be permitted
to return?”185
By rhetorically asking, “Whither shall he flee?,” the court seems to imply
that there is no obvious place where the retreating victim could find sanctuary.
This, of course, is a relatively accurate portrayal of the feudal era from which
the castle metaphor derives. In a period distinguished by a weak central
government incapable of protecting persons or property, the people relied
instead on local lords who lived in fortified buildings equipped with dungeons
and drawbridges, turrets and towers, moats and keeps—in short, castles.186
Beautiful language evoking the medieval period appears again in People v.
Tomlins, a 1914 case in which a man, acting in self-defense, killed his twentytwo-year-old son in the cottage where they both lived.187 At trial, the court
instructed that under these circumstances the father had a duty to retreat if he
could safely do so, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed.188 In an
opinion by Judge Cardozo, the court quoted Lord Chief Justice Hale to the
effect that a man attacked in his own home was not then, and never had been,
required to retreat.189 Continuing in his own words, Cardozo wrote, “He is
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own
home.”190 Here, Cardozo uses two alliterative pairs: fields and fugitive,
highways and home, to create a passage of Churchillian beauty. Then, he
employs a rhetorical device called a chiasmus, or “crossing”—derived from the

183

Id. at 9.
Id. at 16.
185 Id.
186 For a description of the disorder “approaching anarchy” that characterized medieval Europe, see
SABINE, supra note 95, at 214.
187 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
184
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Greek for chi or X191—to compose this lovely sentence: “Flight is for sanctuary
and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”192
In keeping with Zamyatin’s description of the image in which one “truly
believes,” the leitmotif of the castle has “spread its roots” beyond the image of
the home as a sanctuary to the implied converse as well: the picture of any
place outside the home as wild, dangerous, and lacking in succor. In studying
self-defense, then, we have the pleasure of contemplating not only our own era,
but also the era roughly one thousand years ago when our ancestors lived under
feudalism—that system of vassalage and decentralized power that prepared the
way for limited monarchy and democracy.193
X. MISERERE MEI DEUS: THE POETRY RECITAL IN CRIMINAL LAW
Working in criminal law, one gains a sense of connectedness to people and
practices of long ago. In studying homicide, for instance, one learns about a
monetary fine for murder called the murdrum, which is related to our word
murder. According to one widely held theory, the murdrum originated in the
years following the Norman Conquest, when the English often expressed
resistance to their conquerors through secret assassinations.194 To deter such
hidden slayings, William I declared that if a Frenchman were the victim of an
unlawful homicide and no culprit were brought to justice, one hundred
Englishmen would be assessed a fine, or murdrum.195 If, on the other hand, an
Englishman were unlawfully slain, and the slayer not discovered, no such fine
would be levied on the French.196 This is a beguiling part of legal history
191

SHERIDAN BAKER, THE COMPLETE STYLIST AND HANDBOOK 462 (3d ed. 1984).
Tomlins, 107 N.E. at 497.
193 In his magnum opus, Barrington Moore argues that “Western feudalism . . . favor[ed] democratic
possibilities.” BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND
PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 415 (1966). Specifically, he singles out the “notion
of . . . immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, along with the conception of the
right of resistance to unjust authority. . . . [and] the conception of contract as . . . a crucial legacy from
European medieval society to modern Western conceptions of a free society.” Id.; see also STANLEY
ROTHMAN ET AL., EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 24 (1976) (citing the “tradition of reciprocal obligations
that was feudalism” as the origin of rules limiting the power of the monarchy); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 109 (2d ed. 1988) (referring to the role of feudalism in “check[ing]
royal power” in England).
194 E.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 445 (5th ed. 1956). But
see Bruce R. O’Brien, From Mordor to Murdrum: The Preconquest Origin and Norman Revival of the Murder
Fine, 71 SPECULUM 321, 325 (1966) (arguing that the murder fine originated before the Norman Conquest,
with the Danish King Cnut).
195 PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 445.
196 Id.
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because it highlights the intimate connection between criminal justice and
government. The very fact that the rulers felt compelled to adopt such a
measure as the murdrum bears witness to the hostility that a conquered people
harbored toward their foreign invaders.197
Of course, this story does not explain the contemporary meaning of murder
as an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Historians
believe that, along with the meaning of murdrum as a fine, it also signified a
secret killing198 or, specifically, a killing effected by “lying in wait.”199 A
killing perpetrated in secret was considered more heinous than other
homicides; thus, it makes sense that the word would eventually apply to the
most terrible in a hierarchy of unlawful killings. But exactly how murdrum
came to be associated with “malice aforethought” remains unknown.200
Besides the tensions between the Anglo-Saxons and their Norman rulers,
another force that greatly affected the evolution of criminal law was the desire
to limit capital punishment. For about four hundred years after the Norman
Conquest, all homicides were deemed murder and punishable by death.201 But
in the late fifteenth century this began to change as manslaughter came into
being to allow for a kind of homicide that was not a capital offense.202 Based
on its roots, the Anglo-Saxon word manslaughter should mean the same as its
French counterpart, homicide, but as J.H. Baker has noted, “the French word
homicide became the genus, while the Anglo-Saxon words manslaughter and
murder represented two of its species.”203 When I explain this distinction to
my students, it seems to help. For without the historical context, they
sometimes revert to the layman’s tendency to think of all unlawful killings as
murder.
Even before the creation of a category called manslaughter, another legal
doctrine evolved to “mitigate the extreme rigor of the criminal laws.”204 This
doctrine, benefit of clergy, did not exclude any types of homicide from the

197 See O’Brien, supra note 194, at 322 (summarizing the view “accepted by most Anglo-Norman
historians . . . that . . . Norman lordship was commonly resisted by violent, even ‘terrorist,’ force”).
198 E.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 445; S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON
LAW 370 (1969).
199 PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 444.
200 See J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, 83 L.Q. REV. 365, 366–68 (1967).
201 See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 651 (1st ed. 1997).
202 See J.H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW 227 (2000).
203 Id.
204 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 75, at 158 (defining benefit of the clergy).
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death penalty, but instead exempted an occupation, the clergy, from the
jurisdiction of the civil courts and from capital punishment.205 By and large,
only members of the clergy were literate, so felons could prove their clerical
status by reading aloud from the Bible206—usually Psalm 51, verse 1, which
begins, “Miserere Mei, Deus: ‘Have mercy on me, O God.’”207 Eminently
suitable in theme, this verse became known by a colorful name: “The NeckVerse.”208 Over time, a custom grew whereby shrewd felons, assisted by
sympathetic jailers, would memorize this passage and, by pretending to read it,
escape hanging.209 In the lifesaving power of this single verse, we see the
early entwinement of poetry with criminal law.
XI. “A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME”210: THE DISPUTE OVER METAPHOR IN
CRIMINAL LAW
But should criminal law be entwined with poetry? Some legal scholars
answer this question with a vehement “No.” According to these critics, the
mellifluous names and definitions of criminal law are “amorphous,”211
“broad,”212 and virtually meaningless.213 The defining characteristic of
murder—malice aforethought—is said to be “inscrutable on its face”214 and “a
term of art, if not a term of deception.”215 The premeditation–deliberation
formula, which distinguishes first- and second-degree intentional murder, is
criticized as a “mystifying cloud of words.”216 And the various definitions of
depraved heart murder are dismissed as “notoriously unhelpful”217—“a

205

Id.
Id.
207 FRANCIS WATT, THE LAW’S LUMBER ROOM 4 (1895); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
75, at 1031 (defining neck-verse).
208 See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66 (1970) (defining neck-verse).
209 CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE ROOTS OF EVIL: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 16
(1963).
210 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, ll. 43–44.
211 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (And Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 43 (2000).
212 Id.
213 Cf. MARCUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: THE MODEL PENAL CODE 2 (2002) (describing the author’s
first encounter with the Model Penal Code, when he found that “[s]uddenly words mattered; words even
retained their meaning from one rule to the next”).
214 Robinson, supra note 211, at 43.
215 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1978).
216 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW 27 (1930).
217 Mounts, supra note 18, at 362.
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collection of colorful verbiage”218 that “tend[s] to carry more flavor than
meaning.”219
Disdaining criminal law’s figurative language, with its inevitable
ambiguity, legal scholars have urged replacing the traditional terms with words
that have precise and consistent meanings.220 Like Juliet Capulet, who urged
Romeo to “be some other name”221 because Montague is “nor hand nor
foot/Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part/Belonging to a man,”222 these
scholars assume that names are mere “arbitrary symbol[s]”223 and can thus be
altered with impunity. In a concrete manifestation of this assumption, the
American Law Institute sponsored the creation of the Model Penal Code
(MPC), which has been adopted in substantial part by more than half the
states.224 The explicit purpose of the MPC is to “dispel the obscurity” of the
common law.225
In contrast to its critics, I believe that the common law language of criminal
law is valuable for its beauty, its rich historical resonance, and its expressive
meaning. Rather than being a failed attempt at precise language, the common
law terminology is, I propose, a different kind of language altogether. It is
what philosopher Philip Wheelwright calls “expressive” or “depth
language,”226 where ambiguity stems not from sloppiness but from an effort to
unite diverse associations and thereby invent new meanings.227
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KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 362 (2005).
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 441 (7th ed. 2001).
220 See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, A Case of Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 417, 459 (1974)
(describing the ambiguity of depraved heart murder and suggesting that “we would be better off without it”);
Robinson, supra note 211, at 10 (arguing that a criminal code should be drafted in “common and plain words
where possible and provide straightforward definitions” using “short and clear” sentences).
221 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1.
222 Id.
223 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. at 14 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980) (quoting the 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
224 KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 133.
225 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
226 PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, THE BURNING FOUNTAIN: A STUDY IN THE LANGUAGE OF SYMBOLISM 15 (rev.
ed. 1968) (emphasis added).
227 Id. at 81 (describing “[p]oetically charged language” as always “produc[ing] an integral meaning that
radically transcends the sum of the ingredient meanings”); see also OWEN BARFIELD, Poetic Diction and Legal
Fiction, in THE REDISCOVERY OF MEANING, AND OTHER ESSAYS 44, 60 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of
metaphor in making meaning and explaining why “the logical use of language can never add any meaning to
it”).
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In his seminal books Metaphor and Reality228 and The Burning
Fountain,229 Wheelwright distinguishes between “expressive” language, on the
one hand, and what he calls “steno” language, on the other.230 Steno-language
refers to utterances that have a “fixed set of associations,” the same in every
context.231 This rigidity of meaning may come about in two ways: from
prescription, as in science (and the MPC), or from inertia, as in metaphors that
have lost their freshness from overuse (for instance, “a tragic death”).232 In its
prescribed form, steno-language eschews vagueness and ambiguity and “can
be shared in exactly the same way by a very large number of persons.”233 This
“public exactitude,”234 rather than evocativeness or nuance, is the virtue of
steno-language.
In expressive language, on the other hand, the meanings of words are not
fixed but may vary with the context. Expressive language is “selftranscendent,”235 evoking associations that generate tension, even paradox, by
their juxtaposition. For instance, in the phrase depraved heart, a word
associated with evil is juxtaposed to one associated with goodness, resulting in
a term that is vibrant with contradiction. In expressive utterances, as in poetry,
the choice of language is never accidental; rather, there is an organic and
interactive relationship between the words and the thought.236 While lacking
the clarity and precision of steno-language, expressive language has its own
virtue: fullness of expression.237
Framing the issue still more broadly, I believe that the figurative language
of criminal law reflects the ethos of the Romantic Movement,238 whereas the
228

PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, METAPHOR AND REALITY (1962).
WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 226.
230 Id. at 17.
231 Id. at 50.
232 See WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 228, at 37, 94.
233 Id. at 33.
234 Id. at 94.
235 WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 226, at 7.
236 Id. at 76. Illustrating this point, Wheelwright says that “if Shakespeare had decided to let the Weird
Sisters inhabit water . . . instead of ‘fog and filthie air,’ the whole play of Macbeth would have been
profoundly different.” Id. (quoting WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 228, at 95).
237 Id. at 15. Cf. C.S. Lewis, Bluspels and Flalanspheres, in THE NORTON READER 136, 148 (Arthur M.
Eastman ed., rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that “meaning . . . is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood”
and that imaginative language is richer in meaning than literal language).
238 The resonance between criminal law and Romanticism has been largely overlooked by previous
scholars. For example, the 760-page book Romanticism: An Oxford Guide contains numerous chapters
demonstrating the themes of Romanticism in fields such as ecology, feminism, post-colonialism, science,
politics, and psychoanalysis, but makes no mention of criminal law. See ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE
229
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opposition to this language reflects the ethos of the Enlightenment. In The
Passion of the Western Mind, historian and philosopher Richard Tarnas
describes the Romantic vision of reality that arose in Europe in the late
eighteenth century and how it departed from that of the Classical school: “For
the Romantic, reality was symbolically resonant through and through, and was
therefore fundamentally multivalent, a constantly changing complex of manyleveled meanings, even of opposites. For the Enlightenment-scientific mind,
by contrast, reality was concrete and literal, univocal.”239 When we understand
the disagreement over the language of criminal law as a particular instance of a
vast historical and philosophical debate, we realize that both kinds of language
are necessary; they are dialectically related Weltanschauungs and form parts of
a single whole.
XII. “HALF-VEILED AND HALF-REVEALED”: THE DUSKY IMAGES AND
SHROUDED TRUTHS OF CRIMINAL LAW
The artist leaves his “deep and hidden truth” half-veiled and halfrevealed.

Robert Donington240
Amidst the rich, figurative language of criminal law, this Essay has
considered imagery that clusters around several subjects: the body (depraved
heart, hot blood, the hand of forgiveness); fire (heat of passion, simmering,
cooling-off, rekindling); the journey (dangerous proximity, last step, place of
repentance); and the feudal past (attornment, castle, retreat to the wall). But
we have yet to discuss another important leitmotif, that of the earth’s turning
or, more exactly, the shadows and darkness that descend upon the earth when it
faces away from the sun or is blocked from the sun’s rays. To be sure, some of
these images fall into the class that Zamyatin calls “individual, chance
images . . . which live for a brief moment, and then are extinguished,
forgotten.”241
(Nicholas Roe ed., 2005). And yet, to echo what Andrew Michael Roberts writes about psychoanalysis,
criminal law and Romanticism “seem made for each other.” Andrew Michael Roberts, Psychoanalysis, in
ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE, supra at 219, 219. In addition to the central role of figurative language,
another characteristic that criminal law shares with Romanticism is the “foregrounding of individual
consciousness.” See Paul D. Sheats, Lyric, in ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE, supra at 310, 319. In
criminal law, the central importance of individual subjectivity is reflected in the concept of mens rea. See,
e.g., supra text accompanying notes 42–55.
239 RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 368 (1991).
240 ROBERT DONINGTON, WAGNER’S ‘RING’ AND ITS SYMBOLS 13, 15 (3d ed. 1984).
241 ZAMYATIN, supra note 153, at 198.
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Such is the image of “shadows” in the phrase “mere names and shadows,”
which a court used to belittle the refined subtleties of embezzlement law in one
nineteenth-century case.242 In that case, the defendant argued that a quantity of
wheat stored in a warehouse was not “under his care”;243 thus, the crime of
embezzlement (which requires that the “appropriated” property be in the
lawful possession of the embezzler) was not established.244 Upholding the
conviction, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that courts should not be
“misled by mere names and shadows.”245
As in the embezzlement case, the court in United States v. Lyons246
employs images of visible darkness—twilight and dusk—to convey the concept
of insignificance. Specifically, the Lyons court alludes to the hazy distinction
between these two stages of nightfall to disparage the “irresistible impulse”
prong of the insanity defense. Poetically, it writes, “The line between an
irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than
between twilight and dusk.”247
Yet another chance expression of the darkness archetype appears in the
court’s explanation of character evidence in Michelson v. United States.248
Here, the court states that witnesses may not testify about their personal
experience with the defendant—only as to the defendant’s reputation, that is,
“as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood.”249 Reminiscent
of Plato’s allegory of the cave where the prisoners see only shadows projected
onto the wall by the fire behind them,250 this use of the metaphor emphasizes
the difference between mediated perceptions and “direct” experience.
Among chance images that relate to the earth’s circadian rhythm, a
particularly striking illustration appears in Justice Burger’s opinion in the 1975
case of Breed v. Jones.251 The case concerns the privilege against double
jeopardy—more specifically, whether it should apply to minors who are
242

Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 366 (1868).
Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
247 Id. at 248 (quoting American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 J. AM.
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
248 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478–86 (1948).
249 Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
250 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 193–94 (Allan Bloom trans. & ed., Basic Books 2d ed. 1968) (c.
360 B.C.E).
251 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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adjudicated first in juvenile court and then, after transfer, in criminal court.252
Three paragraphs into the analytic part of the opinion, Justice Burger sums up
the Court’s reasoning in these words: “We believe it is simply too late in the
day to conclude . . . that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose
object is to determine whether he has . . . violate[d] a criminal law and whose
potential consequences include . . . stigma . . . and the deprivation of liberty for
many years.”253
I have always admired this sentence, but never fully understood why. Now
I see that in the five short words comprising the phrase “too late in the day,”
Justice Burger has accomplished something remarkable. He has not only
alluded to the great juvenile justice cases of the 1960s and early 70s;254 not
only suggested that the holding in Breed could not, logically, be other than it
is; but also, with that brief image, he managed to recall the seventy-five year
history of a grand social experiment: the ardent enthusiasm of those who
espoused the virtues of the juvenile court at the end of the last century, who
clung to hope in the face of growing disappointment, and who, by 1975,
experienced regret and a sense of defeat.255
In addition to its role as a “chance” image in numerous criminal cases,
darkness has been a dominant image in the crime of burglary. As early as the
1450s, perhaps earlier, it was settled that burglary included a nocturnal
element256—a requirement that naturally raised the question of how night
should be defined. The answer, in the beginning, was that night meant any
time between sunset and sunrise.257 From the criminal perspective, this
interpretation was harsh for it allowed a conviction for burglary even when the
offense occurred under conditions of partial visibility, when a glow emanated

252

Id. at 519.
Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
254 See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that when a juvenile is charged with a
criminal offense, every element of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles accused of crimes in juvenile proceedings must be accorded the same due
process rights as adults); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that the juvenile court’s latitude
in determining whether to waive jurisdiction and allow a case to be heard in criminal court is not total).
255 For a brief summary of the history of the juvenile justice system, see Breed, 421 U.S. at 528–29
(acknowledging the “gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities”). For more
detailed discussions, see Introduction to Part II: The Origin of the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY 27, 27–36 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979); Anthony Platt, The Rise
of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional Reform, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY, supra at 115, 115–138.
256 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 532 (4th ed. 2002).
257 Id.
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from below the horizon, at dawning or at twilight. More benevolent in its
impact on criminals was an interpretation adopted later—that of night as the
time “when a man’s face could not be discerned.”258 This approach would
have benefitted the offender who, when unlawfully “breaking and entering a
dwelling of another at night with intent to commit some felony inside,”259
made sure to do so between daybreak and sunrise, or between sunset and total
darkness.
In contemporary times, some American jurisdictions have obliterated the
“at night” element of burglary, but regardless of the statutory definition,
darkness still carries rhetorical power. In fact, Judge Leventhal’s dissent in
United States v. Barker, one of the cases emerging out of the Watergate
scandal of the 1970s—one of the most beautiful dissents in all of criminal
law—uses nighttime both literally and symbolically to great effect.260 Barker
concerns two men who broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist
in hopes of discrediting the man (Ellsberg) who had released the Pentagon
Papers to the press.261 The two men assumed that their supervisor, who wrote
to Barker on White House stationary, could legally authorize the forcible
break-in as a patriotic act in the interest of national security.262 In this
assumption they were, of course, mistaken. The question the court faces on
appeal is whether their mistake should exonerate them.263
Although time of day is not an issue in this case, Judge Leventhal
emphasizes when the crime was committed, using expressions such as
“compounded by subterfuge [and] dark of night.”264 Toward the end of the
opinion, Leventhal again alludes to night, this time substituting the more
ominous word “dead” for “dark,” thus conjuring up thoughts of homicide.265
Using the intimate first-person point of view and slowing down the sentence
through repetition, dashes, and monosyllabic words, Judge Leventhal offers the
reader this moving statement of personal belief: “I come back—again and
again in my mind—to the stark fact that we are dealing with a breaking and
258

Id. at 533.
KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 561.
260 546 F.2d 940, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For background on the Watergate scandal, see JOHN W. DEAN,
BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1976); and JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATTLES
OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS COX AND JAWORSKI (1977).
261 Barker, 546 F.2d at 943.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 944.
264 Id. at 958.
265 Id. at 973.
259

DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

9/10/2010 10:25 AM

BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT

1243

entering in the dead of night, both surreptitious and forcible, and a violation of
civil rights statutes.”266 The next sentence is the last substantive sentence in
the opinion, and in this prominent place the judge presents a variation on his
theme: “This,” he writes, “is simply light years away from the kinds of
situations where the law has gingerly carved out exceptions permitting
reasonable mistake of law as a defense.”267 Ironically, the phrase “light years”
evokes, for many of us, the seemingly infinite darkness of a journey through
space, the kind of pilgrimage that light must make to reach us from a star.
As in particular cases, judges employ the images of nighttime, dusk,
shadow, and twilight to clarify their reasoning or render a holding more
eloquent, so also in criminal law generally, scholars use metaphors of obscurity
to describe the enigmatic nature of the field.268 As we have seen, these
metaphors are often intended as criticisms, yet the nebulousness of the
doctrines may be the very quality that gives criminal law its beauty. Like the
artist, criminal law “leaves [its] ‘deep and hidden truth’ half-veiled and halfrevealed.”269 And the veil that criminal law drapes over its “truth” is
composed of language—the beautiful language of poetry.
EPILOGUE
Some say a marshaling of horsemen, others, soldiers on the march,
And others still say that a fleet of ships is the most beautiful thing
on the dark earth. I say
it is what you love.
270

Sappho, Fragment 16

One evening, not long ago, I had dinner again with the friend who had
wondered how I could work in “that field.” We met in the same Italian
restaurant as before, though it seemed like a different place because of
attractive renovations. The walls, which had previously shone bright yellow,
were now a stylish pumpkin; the blinding overhead lighting had been replaced
by the soft glow of Tiffany pendant lamps, and the tables, which had been
crowded together, were separated now, resulting in a more peaceful ambience.
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Id.
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268 See supra text accompanying notes 211–219.
269 DONINGTON, supra note 240, at 15.
270 Sappho, Fragment 16, quoted in epigraph to ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, ONLY A PROMISE OF HAPPINESS:
THE PLACE OF BEAUTY IN A WORLD OF ART (2007).
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In addition to the altered decor, the restaurant boasted a new menu, so my
friend and I departed from our traditional eggplant parmigiana and ordered the
apple- and goat-cheese ravioli and lasagna.
In the months since our previous dinner, I had reflected on my friend’s
remark. Her implicit question had startled me then, leaving me unable to
articulate a response. Now better prepared, I explained that criminal law
succeeded to the passion I once bestowed on my first intellectual love—
political science. According to Max Weber’s classic description, the state “has
been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force
as a means of domination within a territory.”271 Punishment, a “legitimate use
of physical force,” is thus a quintessential function of the state. And, because
of the risk it poses to life and liberty, criminal law represents the juncture
where state and individual interact in the most dramatic way; the point at
which the state goes furthest in exerting its authority over the citizen.
But whereas, in the beginning, my attraction to criminal law centered on
what one might call its “hard” aspect—its inextricable link to authority and
violence—over time, my fascination with the field came to derive from its
“soft” qualities as well—from the rich poetry of its images, the melody of its
cadences, and the aesthetically pleasing contrast between its facts, which are
ever new, and its doctrines, which are centuries old.
Almost everything looks different when seen from up close than it does
from afar, and criminal law is no exception. It has taken years for me to move
near enough to see criminal law as a language event, with centripetal as well as
centrifugal meanings; to appreciate that criminal law is “fraught with
background”; to notice the awesome beauty of its doctrines, yet still
sympathize with those who (like my friend) repudiate the field as gory and
macabre. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud suggests that intellectually
engrossing work, if one is lucky enough to find it, may be the most reliable of
all sources of happiness.272 I am grateful to have discovered, in criminal law,
work that can stand up to this challenge and, with it, the opportunity to live for
as well as off my vocation.273
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273 See WEBER, supra note 2, at 84; see also supra text accompanying note 2.
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